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SECTION 734 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
By HARRY J. RUDICKt
To profit from one's own mistakes has traditionally been considered
the hallmark of a wise man. The taxpayer who attempts to pursue this
ancient path to wisdom, however, will find the road strewn with Con-
gressionally created obstacles, such as section 7341 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The kind of profitable error which section 734 is designed to prevent
can be shown by a relatively simple illustration. Corporation A in 1938
sold some property at a profit of $100,000 and reported this profit as a
capital gain. It offset this gain by capital losses of an equal amount and
hence paid no tax on the $100,000. If the gain had been considered ordi-
nary income rather than capital gain, the capital losses could not have
been availed of and the $100,000 would have been taxable. In 1942 Cor-
poration A, which computes its excess profits credit under the income
method,2 discovers that the 1938 profit was not a capital gain, that it was
ordinary income, and that its excess profits credit should be increased by
$25,000, resulting in a 1942 tax saving of approximately $10,000. Ac-
cordingly, it claims in its 1942 excess profits tax return a credit based
on the inclusion in base period income of the $100,000. The Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue challenges the company's position, but the
company successfully litigates the issue.3 At this point section 734 enters
the picture and adds to the 1942 excess profits tax liability of Corporation
A the saving in income tax (plus interest thereon) wlhich resulted from
the erroneous and inconsistent claim in 1938 that the profit was a cap-
ital gain. If we assume that the saving in tax in 1938 amounted to
$19,000, this much plus $4,560 interest 4 thereon (from March 15, 1939,
to March 15, 1943), or a total of $23,560, would be added to the excess
* Lecturer in Law, New York University; Member of the New York Bar.
1. This section was enacted as section 11 of the Excess Profits Tax Amendments of
1941, effective retroactively to the date of enactment of the Excess Profits Tax Act of
1940, as amended by the Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 17. The section is
reproduced as an appendix. (All references in this article to section numbers are to sections
of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding provisions of earlier revenue acts, except
where otherwise stated.) For the Treasury regulations interpreting the section, see U. S.
Treas. Reg. 109, §§ 30.734-1 et seq. These were amended by T. D. 5112, 1942-1 Cum.
Bui.. 153, and after the Revenue Act of 1942 by T. D. 5212, 1943 INT. P-v. Buo., No.
2, at 47.
2. Section 713.
3. The result would be the same if the Commissioner conceded the correctness of
the tax-payer's inconsistent position.
4. This interest would be an allowable deduction to A Corporation in 1943. See page
157 et seq. ifra.
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profits tax otherwise payable by Corporation A for 1942. Thus, the orig-
inal error is corrected and tax justice is presumably achieved, not by col-
lection of additional tax for 1938, but by collection of additional tax for
1942.
That section 734 is "an equitable provision designed not to prevent
inconsistency but to discourage such inconsistency by depriving the guilty
party of any pecuniary benefit therefrom . . . is evidenced by the fact
that an adjustment is not authorized if the party maintaining the incon-
sistent position is the party who would derive a pecuniary benefit from
the adjustment." ' Thus, if the taxpayer corporation had erroneously
capitalized an expenditure in 1938, it could not, by refusing to claim a
consistent depreciation in computing its excess profits tax for 1942,
reduce the 1942 excess profits tax through adjustment under this section
by the income tax overpayment for 1938. On the other hand, if the
corporation in 1942 claims depreciation with respect to the expenditure
and the Commissioner disallows such depreciation on the ground that
the expenditure was fully deductible in 1938, the section operates because
the Commissioner, who is maintaining the inconsistent position,0 is the
party who would be adversely affected ' by the adjustment.
The problem which section 734 is designed to solve is not a new one.
Tax litigants, like litigants in other fields of law, have from, time imme-
morial tried to take advantage of their own errors; and very often they
have succeeded.' While it is true that courts, in an effort to prevent un-
conscionable results, have developed certain corrective doctrines, such
as estoppel,9 recoupment or set-off,10 and election," these doctrines are
ill-defined and limited in their scope, and altogether too uncertain in their
application to furnish a satisfactory solution to the problem. Nor do
they always achieve the same result as if the error had not been com-
mitted. 2 Moreover, the doctrine of estoppel operates as practically a one-
way street to which only the Government has access; at the taxpayer's end
5. SEN. RE'. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 211.
6. This point is discussed page 147 et seq. infra.
7. The adverse effect here referred to is measured solely by the amount of the ad-
justment, not by the over-all effect of assuming the inconsistent position. See page 153
et seq. infra.
8. See, e.g., Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936); see also 10 MERTEs,
LAW oF FEA L INcOmE TAXATION (1943) §§ 60.03, 60.10.
9. See Firemen's Insurance Co., 30 B. T. A. 1004, 1011-13 (1934).
10. See Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 (1937) ; Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247
(1935); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932); cf. McEachem v. Rose, 302 U. S.
56 (1937).
11. See Raleigh v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 622 (Ct. Cl. 1934) ; Estate of Thomas
J. Moran, 26 B. T. A. 1154 (1932), aff'd, Moran v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 601 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1933) ; cf. Estate of William Steele, 34 B. T. A. 173 (1936).
12. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938
(1939) 48 YALE L. 3. 509, 511-15.
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the entry is barred.'3 The inadequacies of these judicial doctrines indi-
cate the appropriateness of legislative action.
Section 734 is not the only Congressional attempt 14 to eliminate prof-
itable inconsistency. However, even though it is applicable only to excess
profits tax, liability, it is much broader in scope and application than the
other-corrective provisions of the Revenue Code.15 The original section
13. 10 MERTE~s, op. cit. supra note 8, § 60.13.
14. See section 820 and the thorough exposition of this section contained in Maguire,
Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12.
15. See sections 3801 and 322(b) (5). While both sections 734 and 3801 are sprung
from the same purpose and while some of the language of the two sections is the same
or similar, they are not correlated. A particular inconsistency might involve the applica-
tion of section 734, but not section 3801, or vice versa, or it might involve the applica-
tion of both sections, or neither section. Section 734 results in increased or decreased
excess profits tax liability. Section 3801 results only in the imposition or refund of ir-
come tax (including personal holding company surtax and other types of income tax).
Section 3801 covers only a limited number of tax inconsistencies, while any error which
produces inconsistency is potentially within the scope of section 734. Section 3S01 can only
affect taxable years as far back as 1932; wlhereas section 734 may involve cmputations fir
taxable years back to 1913. The applicability of section 3801 to corporate tax.payers,
which are the only ones subject to excess profits tax is, for all practical purposes, lim-
ited to cases of inclusion or exclusion of income or deductions in the wrong year coupled
with an attempt to take income tax advantage of the error. The other situations covered
by section 380f, i.e., those where the wrong taxpayer has reported income or claimed a
deduction and a party seeks to take advantage of the error, are not likely to arise with
respect to corporate taxpayers.
Section 322(b) (5) creates a special Statute of Limitations in the case of claims for
income tax refunds or credits based on bad debts and worthless securities. Before its
enactment the taxpayer had no income tax remedy if he erroneously deducted a bad debt
or worthless security loss in an open year and discovered that deduction should have been
claimed in a year outlawed by the ordinary Statute of Limitations. The Commissioner
upon the adoption of section 3801 had acquired protection against the allowance of such
a deduction in the wrong year, but it was believed advisable to exclude the taxpayer from
its operation in such a case for the reason that if it were not, the Statute of Limitations
so far as bad debts and worthless security losses are concerned would have been emascu-
lated. "The taxpayer who neglected to take a deduction properly allowable for 1935, as
to which year the period of limitations on refund claims had expired, could take that
deduction in his return for 1940, or 1941, etc., or claim a refund for those years, force
the Commissioner to take a position inconsistent with the omission of the deduction in
1935, and then, after the Commissioner had won the case, claim an adjustment for
1935." Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12, at 758.
The solution offered by 322(b) (5) is feasible only where it is limited to a few
particular kinds of deduction because extension of the principle to many items of income
or deductions would virtually nullify the ordinary statute. The relief accorded by a
mere extension of the Statute of Limitations is not, moreover, complete. It does not help
the taxpayer if the true loss year is closed for some other reason than the Statute of
Limitations, such as res judicata or a closing agreement. In this respect, at least, sec-
tion 734 supplies a greater safeguard, and is also more helpful to the taxpayer in that
under it the limitation [contained in section 3771(d)] on interest on the refund is not
applicable.
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and its interpretation by the Treasury, were severely criticized by tax
practitioners 16 who pointed out a number of serious defects,1 nearly all
of which have been subsequently remedied. Some of the imperfections
were removed by way of amended Treasury regulations,"" which in 1942
received the approval of the Congressional committees. Others were elim-
inated by amendments contained in the 1942 Revenue Act.1" Since all of
the amendments were made retroactive to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1939,2o the amended statute and the amended regulations
apply to all excess profits tax years.
APPLICATION OF THE SECTION
To whom applicable. Since section 734 operates to increase or decrease
only excess profits tax liability, the only taxpayers who will be directly
affected by it are corporations subject to that tax. The adjustment pro-
vided by the section is made in determining the tax of a "taxpayer ttnder
this [excess profits tax] subchapter." 21 This adjustment, however, may
require recomputation of the tax, not only of the taxpayer 2 itself, bitt
of another taxpayer, if that other taxpayer is a "predecessor" of the tax-
payer. Prior to the 1942 Act the statute contained no definition of the
term "predecessor" and, as a result, hair-raising situations could be imag-
ined in which the unwary taxpayer might by maintaining an inconsistent
position become burdened with tax liabilities of completely unrelated tax-
payers.2" In the 1942 Act Congress came to the rescue by adding a defi-
nition of the term "predecessor." 24 "Predecessor of the taxpayer" in-
cludes only: a person which is a "component corporation" of the taxpayer
16. See AmRIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SECTION ON TAXATION (1942) 7;
AMERICAN BAR ASsoCIATIoN, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON ExcEss-
PROFITS TAXES, SECTION OF TAXATION (1941) 5-12; N. Y. STATE BAR ASsOCIATIoN
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON TAXATION (1942) 211; Blodgett, Pitfalls of Section 734 of the
Excess Profits Tax Law (1941) 19 TAXES 643.
17. These are listed in SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 211, 212.
18. The original regulations were amended by T. D. 5112, 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 153,
amending U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, §§ 30.734-1, 30.734-2.
19. Revenue Act of 1942, § 227(a).
20. Revenue Act of 1942, §227(b).
21. Section 734(b) (1) (A) (italics supplied). The word "subchapter" refers, of
course, to the excess profits tax subchapter of the Code. INT. REV. CODE (1939) c. 2 (E).
22. Section 734(a) (1) defines taxpayer as "any person subject to a tax under the
applicable revenue Act." Presumably, if for any particular year the taxpayer was an
exempt corporation and the adjustment did not affect its exempt status, the required ad-
justment would not take that year into account.
23. See authorities cited supra note 16; see also Hearings before the Ways and
Means Committee on Revenne Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 173 et seq.,
973 et seq.
24. Section 734(a) (4).
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within the meaning of section 740; a person which on April 1, 1941, ' 2 or
at any time thereafter, controlled, as defined in Section 112(h),2' the tax-
payer; and a predecessor of a predecessor.2 7 This definition removes much
of the criticism which was directed at section 734 in its original form,
since the term is now narrowed to a point where it is believed to include
"only those cases in which there is sufficient identity of interest betveen
the parties to warrant their treatment as one for the purpose of the sec-
tion and to require an adjustment where the treatment of an item for
excess profits tax purposes by the one is inconsistent with the treatment
of the item by the other for income tax purposes." 281
Where a person after the enactment of section 734 owns at least 80
per cent of the taxpayer's voting stock and at least 80 per cent of all other
classes of its stock,29 there is apt to be little hardship in charging the tax-
payer with the prior inconsistent treatment by the controlling person.=°
Nor is it likely that there will be any miscarriage of justice where the pre-
decessor is a component corporation under section 740. Under that section
the "component corporation" would have to be one that transferred sub-
stantially all of its properties to the taxpayer in exchange either for all
of the stock or for voting stock of the taxpayer ;31 or transferred prop-
erties to the taxpayer before October 1, 1940, as paid in surplus or a con-
tribution to capital in respect of voting stock owned by the component ; -
or has been merged or consolidated into the taxpayer;' or has been
liquidated tax free into the taxpayer under section 112(b) (6). 31 The
term "component corporation" would also include a partnership or a
25. This was the date of enactment of section 734.
26. Section 112(h) defines control as "the ownership of stock possessing at least EO
per centum of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock!
of the corporation."
27. "For the purpose of section 734 a component corporation of the taxpayer within
the meaning of section 740 is a predecessor of the taxpayer even though section 740 is
not applicable in the determination of the excess profits tax liability of the taxpayer."
SEx. REs. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 212.
28. Ibid. The report states: "The definition will cover most of the cases in which
the excess profits tax liability of the taxpayer is determined by reference to the base
period experience of its predecessor or by reference to the basis of property in the hands
of its predecessor. The limitation of the definition to the above cases, and the resulting
exclusion of other cases, should not be construed to affect the established judicial doc-
trines commonly known as estoppel, recoupment, set-off, etc., which may be applied by
the courts in appropriate cases." Id. at 212-13. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-1.
29. Section 112(h).
30. It is conceivable that there might be some injustice as to the owners of a minor-
ity interest.
31. Section 740(b) (1). Such exchange, of course, would be tax-free.
32. This transaction would also be tax-free.
33. Section 740(b) (3) and (4).
34. Section 740(b) (2).
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sole proprietorship business which transferred substantially all of its
property to the taxpayer and immediately thereafter controlled the tax-
payer. 5 In all of these situations the identity of the taxpayer and the
component corporation is close enough to justify treating them as one
and holding the taxpayer responsible for the errors of the "component."
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ADJUSTMENT
Five conditions are prerequisite to application of section 734. The
excess profits credit " treatment of an item or transaction in the excess
profits tax taxable year must be inconsistent with the income tax 87 treat-
ment of the item by the taxpayer or its predecessor in a prior year; the
income tax treatment in the prior year must have been incorrect; consist-
ent treatment must result in an increased or decreased income tax liabil-
ity of the taxpayer or predecessor for the prior year; income tax correc-
tion must be prevented (except for section 3801 ) by the operation of "any
law or rule of law" (other than compromises tinder section 3761); the
inconsistent position must be maintained by the party-either the tax-
payer or the Government-which would be adversely affected (in so far
as the income tax liability of prior years is concerned) by correction of
the error. The first four of these conditions may be described as passive
constituents of inconsistency. The fifth operates as a catalyst to render
the section applicable.
Excess profits credit treatment inconsistent with income tax treatment
in prior year.18 The statute speaks of the inconsistent treatment of an
"item." What is an item? "' Dictionaries define it as "a separate par-
ticular in an enumeration"; 4 "one of the separate and distinct things
which constitute a whole." 4 The whole in this case is excess profits
credit, and accordingly every thing which has an effect upon that credit
is an item, whether it be a particular 42 of gross income, a particular de-
35. Sections 740(b) (1), 740(a) (1) (D), 740(h). Such a transfer would be tax-free
or partially tax-free under section 112(b) (5), (c) and (e).
36. An inconsistent treatment of an item in determining excess profits net income is
not the basis for adjustment under section 734. 7A MEaTEms, op. cit. mpra note 8, § 42.143.
37. The term "income tax" is hereinafter to be given the technical meaning assigned
to it by section 734(a) (2). See page 143 infra.
38. Section 734(b) (1) (A).
39. The term is not a new one. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12,
at 751-52. Section 42 speaks of "items of gross income." Sections 22(b) and 116 refer
to items to be included in gross income. Section 24 is entitled "Items Not Deductible."
There are probably other statutory provisions which employ the term.
40. WBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY (5th ed. 1939).
41. WEBsTR's DicriONARtY oF SYNONYMS (1942).
42. The aggregate of all items of a particular nature would not be an "item" within
the meaning of section 734. For example, a net capital gain would not be an item; every
detailed transaction entering into the computation of the aggregate would constitute an
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duction, the basis of a particular property, or the amount of a particular
indebtedness. The prescribed inconsistency, according to Treasury regu-
lations, may relate either to the rule of law applied in determining the tax-
able status of the item, or merely to the computed amount of the item,
and the measurement of the inconsistency is to be made according to
actual treatment of the item in the earlier years rather than the treatment
urged by either party in those years.
43
The statute supplies its own definition of the term "income tax" as
used in the phrase "income tax treatment." "' Such income tax includes
not only income taxes in the conventional sense, but other taxes measured
by income, such as the penalty surtax on corporations improperly accumu-
lating surplus, the personal holding company surtax, and the excess and
war profits taxes imposed during the last war period.D It does not in-
clude, however, the declared value excess profits tax,46 the excess profits
tax on Navy contracts,47 the unjust enriclunent tax,48 and certain other
taxes measured by income, such as the tax on transfers to avoid income
tax.4
9
The income tax liabilities which are subject to recomputation are only
those for a taxable year beginning prior to January 1, 1940," for the
obvious reason that the excess profits tax is only applicable to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1939. It may be taken for granted
that items which affect the net income of excess profits tax taxable years
will be treated the same for both income and excess profits tax purposes
item. As to inventories, it would seem proper for purposes of section 734 to require the
entire inventory to be treated as a unit rather than to permit an inconsistent party to
limit his inconsistency to less than all of the ultimate components of the inventory. In
this connection, see Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F. (2d) 131
(C. C. A. 8th, 1943), cert. grantcd, 319 U. S. 737 (1943), where a taxpayer which was
charged with additional income tax by reason of overstatement of its opening inventory
for its 1936 fiscal year was allowed an offset or recoupment on account of the corre-
sponding overstatement of the closing inventory of its 1935 fiscal year. Cases of this sort
clearly fall within section 734 and also seem to fall within section 3801(b) (5).
43. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2.
44. Section 734(a) (2).
45. The taxes included in the definition are those imposed by the following: Iz.T.
REv. CODE (1939) cc. 1 (Income Tax), 2 A (Personal Holding Companies); Revenue
Acts of 1938, 1936, 1934, Titles I (Income Tax), I A (Personal Holding Companies);
Revenue Acts of 1932, 1928, Title I (Income Tax) ; Revenue Acts of 1926, 1924, 1921,
1918, Title II (Income Tax); Revenue Acts of 1921, 1918, Title III (Var Profits and
Excess Profits Tax) ; Revenue Act of 1917, Titles I (War Income Tax), II (War Ex-
cess Profits Tax) ; Revenue Act of 1916, Title I (Income Tax) ; Revenue Act of 1913,
section II (income tax on individuals and corporations).
46. Irr. REv. CODE (1939) c. 2B.
47. INT. REv. CODE (1939) c. 2C.
48. INT. REv. CODE (1939) c. 2D.
49. Icr. REv. CODE (1939) c. 7.
50. Section 734(a) (3).
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except where the statute specifically requires or permits different treat-
ment. When the statute does require such different treatment, section
734 has no application. Section 711 (b),"' for example, permits the exclu-
sion of casualty losses in computing base period income 5' for excess prof-
its tax purposes, but this type of inconsistency requires no adjustment.
, Prior income tax treatment incorrect."5 Section 734 does not come into
play unless the income tax treatment in the prior year was erroneous. In
short, the present position must be correct; for otherwise there is no in-
consistency. In determining whether the treatment in the prior year was
erroneous, the governing law is the law applicable to that year. 4 If a
lessor, for example, reported income in 1937 by reason of coming into
possession of a building constructed by its lessee, the fact that under the
present law no income results from such a transaction is of no signifi-
cance. But if the prior income tax treatment was based upon an authori-
tative judicial interpretation which differs from the interpretation now
accepted in the determination of the prior year's income tax liability, it is
erroneous within the meaning of the section." Thus, if a taxpayer in
1934 treated a distribution received from another corporation as non-
taxable because of court decisions then controlling and in 1943 the tax-
payer asserts that such dividends were taxable because of later decisions
holding them taxable, the fact that in 1934 the dividend was commonly
considered a return of capital does not prevent the prior treatment from
being erroneous.
Consistent treatment resulting in an increased or decreased prior year's
income tax liability." If the correction of the error would result in no
increase or decrease in income tax liability of the taxpayer or its prede-
cessor for some prior year, the amount of the adjustment would always be
nil. The statute, in such a case, has no application because, under its terms,
there must be an increase or decrease. Where a taxpayer, for example,
is claiming in 1943 that his accumulated profits should be increased on
account of erroneous deductions claimed in certain years prior to 1940
51. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2; H. R. REP. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1942) 20.
52. However, where, pursuant to the election conferred by section 733, the taxpayer
chooses to capitalize advertising expenditures during the base period, an adjustment under
section 734 is required. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2; H. R. REp. No. 146, 77th
Cong.,. 1st Sess. (1942) 20.
53. Section 734(b) (2).
54. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2; H. R. RmP, No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1942) 20.
55. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, §30.734-2; H. R. RESp. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1942) 20. Presumably erroneous treatment which is allowed to remain erroneous mere-
ly because of only prospective application of a decision or ruling is still erroneous.
56. Section 734(b) (1) (B).
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and the taxpayer in those years sustained large losses, so that the disal-
lowance of the deductions would still leave the taxpayer with no tax liabil-
ity, one of the requirements is lacking and the section does not operate.
The inapplicability of the section would not, of course, preclude the tax-
payer from taking the inconsistent position."7
Correction prevented. Since the whole purpose of the section is to pre-
vent unconscionable use of a barrier to correction, the section will never
be applicable where correction in some other way is possible. Thus, if the
period of limitations with respect to the prior year is still open so that
the aggrieved party may by proper action obtain redress, the section will
not apply. The statute as provides that correction 50 must be prevented
(except for the provisions of section 3801) "by the operation I of any
law or rule of law, other than section 3761, relating to compromises."
The most common of such laws or rules of law would be, of course, the
Statute of Limitations. The provision would also include the doctrine of
res judicata,"1 the rule against splitting causes of action,02 closing agree-
ments under section 3760,' and sections 272(f) and 322(b) which pro-
hibit all deficiencies, credits, and refunds after the filing of a petition with
the Tax Court except those which conform to the requirements of the sec-
tions." Sections 3770, 3774, and 3775 of the Internal Revenue Code re-
lating to payments, refunds, or credits after the period of limitations has
expired might also prevent correction of the error.
By specific provision, the fact that correction is permitted under sec-
tion 3801 does not bar application of section 734. Accordingly, incon-
sistent treatment may result in the application of both sections."' In such a
case, correction under section 3801 will, however, affect the amount of
tax previously determined for the prior year, 0 and the financial penalty
on the inconsistent party will not be increased because of the concurrent
operation of the two sections.
57. Compare Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523 (1943).
58. Section 734(b) (1) (C).
59. "On, the date of such determination of the tax under this subchapter ... 
60. ". . . whether before, on, or after the date of enactment of section 734 ... 
U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2.
61. Section 3801 speaks of correction being prevented by the operation of "any
provision of the internal-revenue laws." It might he claimed that this phrase includes
only statutory law and not judicial doctrines like res judicata. Presumably for this rea-
son the language of section 734 was made broad enough to include judicial doctrines.
See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, muPra note 12, at 729, 730, 732.
62. Id. at 728.
63. See id. at 725, n. 67 for discussion of the question whether there is an impairment
of contract.
64. Where these sections apply, res judicata and the rule against splitting cause, s:f
action may also apply. Maguire, Surrey and Tra.nor, supra note 12, at 726.
65. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2.
66. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
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Apother specific provision prohibits the application of the section to a
prior year in which the income tax liability has been compromised under
section 3761. The compromise contemplated by section 3761 is a "for-
mal" compromise specifically effectuated under the provisions of the sec-
tion.17 Undoubtedly, the reason for not applying section 734 where the
closed year is a "compromise" year is the difficulty of computing the ad-
justment in such a case.0 " Such compromises are usually effected on a
dollar basis without reference to any particular treatment of an item and
computation of the adjustment would be extremely complex, if not im-
possible. Particularly is this so in the large number of cases where the
compromise is based on "doubt as to collectability" rather than on "doubt
as to liability."
"Informal" compromises or settlements, which constitute the great bulk
of the actual compromises and settlements entered into by the Treasury
Department,0 9 are ostensibly not within the scope of the exception. Yet
the reasons which presumably prompted Congress to except formal com-
promises are frequently applicable to informal settlements. The final tax
liability in such cases is often as much a matter of give and take as it is
in formal compromises,7" even though, on paper, a particular treatment
is adopted.71 The omission of informal comprohise is still a potential
defect of section 734 and may ultimately require correction. The provi-
sion laying upon the person who would profit from the adjustment the
burden of proving that an inconsistent position has been taken 12 has only
partially resolved the difficulty. Assume, for example, that the Com-
missioner is now asserting that a particular security issued years ago by
the taxpayer constitutes indebtedness although in a prior year he had
conceded the security to be preferred stock. Assume further that the lia-
bility for the earlier year had been settled in such a way that it is impos-
sible to say definitely whether the "dividends" on the "stock" were allowed
as a deduction or not. The taxpayer will charge that the Commissioner
67. The section, formerly REv. STAT. § 3229 (1875), is discussed in PAUL, SELECTED
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES (1938) 53 et seq. Section 734 does not
specifically mention compromises under REv. STAT. § 3469 (1875) nor compromises made
by the Attorney General under the powers inherent in his office. However, the reasons
which prompted Congress to except compromises under section 3761 of tile Internal Rev-
enue Code are equally applicable to compromises of the other two types and it seems
probable therefore that either of the three types of compromises will constitute a bar to
the operation of section 734. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12, at 733-34,
n. 91.
68. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12.
69. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 71.
70. See the example given in PAUL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 71.
71. See Statement by Excess Profits Tax Committee of American Bar Association,
Point (6), Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee on Revenue Revision of 1942,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 175.
72. See page 150 et seq. infra.
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is maintaining an inconsistent position, but since the adjustment will be
in the tax-payer's favor, he must prove the Commissioner's inconsistency.
Because of the nature of the settlement he may be unable to meet the bur-
den. Despite this possible hardship, it is suggested that before any at-
tempt is made to overhaul the section with a view to eliminating the diffi-
culty, time should be allowed to see how the section works out in prac-
tice.
Maintenance of inconsistent position. The four conditions previously
discussed remain passive until either the taxpayer or the Government, "in
determining at any time" the taxpayer's excess profits tax liability, as-
sumes a position inconsistent with its or its predecessor's prior treatment.
which would result in an adjustment to his disadvantage.3 In other
words, one cannot choose to be inconsistent in order to derive gain from
the section. Thus, the maintenance of an inconsistent position by the tax-
payer will never invoke section 734 where consistent and correct treat-
ment would result in the payment of lower taxes for the prior years;
where the inconsistent position is taken by the Commissioner, the section
will apply only if consistent treatment would result in a reduction of tax
liability for such prior years. Suppose, for example, that the taxpayer
exchanged some property in 1930 and reported the exchange as tax free.
It now claims, correctly, that the exchange was taxable and that accord-
ingly its earnings and profits, and hence its invested capital credit, should
be increased. Assuming that the inclusion of the gain would have in-
creased the taxpayer's 1930 liability, the section applies.' The Commis-
sioner, on the other hand, could not by voluntarily increasing the taxpay-
er's invested capital invoke section 734 and collect additional tax with
respect to 1930.
As another illustration, assume that the Commissioner in auditing the
1940 excess profits tax return of the tax-payer disallows a certain amount
of depreciation on the ground that the rates used by the taxpayer in that
year were too high. The taxpayer has used the same rates in the years
1936 through 1939, and it is reasonable to conclude, assuming that con-
ditions in those years were the same as in 1940, that if the rates were too
high in 1940, they were also too high in the base period years. Clearly,
this situation does not authorize the application of section 734,3 since
73. This "disadvantage" refers only to the increase or decrease in prior years' taxes.
Presumably, this disadvantage will be more than matched by the excess profits tax gain
resulting from the inconsistent treatment; otherwise, the inconsistent party, if well ad-
vised, will withdraw from the inconsistent position. See page 149 et seq. infra.
74. If the taxpayer finds that the increase in 1930 tax will be greater than the saving
which flows from the increased credit, he will presumably withdraw from the inconsistent
position.
75. In this situation the Commissioner would probably find it to his advantage to
assert the applicability of the section only if the taxpayer computed its excess profits
credit under the invested capital method.
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even if we assume that the Commissioner is maintaining an inconsistent
position, correction of the error, that is the adjustment, would result to
his advantage.7" Suppose, however, that the taxpayer, ultimately conced-
ing the correctness of the Commissioner's disallowance of 1940 depreci-
ation, claims a higher excess profits credit on the ground that the income
shown in its returns for 1936-1939 was understated by reason of excessive
depreciation. It is then difficult to conclude that the taxpayer is "maintain-
ing" a position when it is forced upon him by the Commissioner." More-
over, the statutory scheme contemplates that the excessive depreciation in
past years will be corrected, pursuant to regulations which have been up-
held by the courts, by adjustment of depreciation in future years. For
these reasons, it is extremely doubtful whether depreciation adjustments
of the type just discussed are within the purview of section 734.
On the other hand, if the Commissioner asserts that the taxpayer failed
to take sufficient depreciation in prior years, so that upon a sale of the
depreciable property the gain is greater than that reported by the taxpayer,
it would seem that section 734 should apply. In such a case correction
of the erroneous under-depreciation other than by section 734 is pre-
cluded.7"
76. Wherever we speak of "advantage" in this connection we refer only to taxes
for the prior years. The over-all advantage may be the other way. See notes 73 and
74 supra.
77. A somewhat analogous situation exists where the Commissioner disallows com-
pensation as being unreasonable and the same amount of compensaticn-for the same
quality and degree of service-has been paid in the base period years. Such a situation
is not on all fours with depreciation, since the excessive deduction in past years is not
corrected by reduced deductions in future years.
78. Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523 (1943). The question of
depreciation in connection with section 734 is a troublesome one. In view of sections 114 (a)
and 113(b) (1) (B), which provide that the basis upon which depreciation is allowed shall
be adjusted for exhaustion, wear, and tear, "to the extent allowed (but not less than
the amount allowable) under this chapter or prior income tax laws," is there any incon-
sistency if, assuming that prior depreciation has been allowed as claimed, either the
Commissioner or the taxpayer alleges that the basis for depreciation at the beginning
of the excess profits tax taxable year is incorrect? If the Treasury regulations as amended
by T. D. 4422, XIV-1 Cum. BULL 58 (1934), are followed literally, there will only
be occasion to adjust the basis if the depreciation allowed in the earlier years was less
than the amount allowable. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, 74, art. 265; U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, 62,
art. 165. Where the amount allowed was in excess of the amount allowable, no ad-
justment to basis is permissible. Only the remaining life may be adjusted. To illus-
trate: assume that at the beginning of 1934 the taxpayer purchased an item of machin-
ery for $1,000. He has claimed and been allowed depreciation in the years 1934 through
1939 of ten per cent per annum, so that by the end of 1939 the machine is sixty per cent
depreciated-salvage value is ignored. The Commissioner, in auditing 1940 discovers that
the asset should have been depreciated at the rate of five per cent per annum and that its
remaining life is fourteen years. Accordingly, he takes the remaining basis, $400, and
dividing it by fourteen he arrives at an annual depreciation for 1940 and subsequent years
of $25.87. As explained in the text, this action by the Commissioner would not be an
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Since the statute authorizes an adjustment if "at any time" 70 in deter-
mining the excess profits tax of the taxpayer an inconsistent position is
adopted, a final determination of such tax is not a condition precedent to
an adjustment under the section. The filing of an excess profits tax return
by the taxpayer is a determination. The assertion of a deficiency by the
Commissioner is a determination, as is also the allowance or disallowance
of a refund claim. A decision of a court is, of course, a determination.,'
But the adjustment required by the sectioil does not become final until the
determination itself becomes final. Thus, if a decision which adopts an
inconsistent treatment is appealed and is reversed, so that the inconsistent
treatment is not adopted, the section ceases to apply.
The regulations as originally issued and the legislative committee re-
ports in 1941 were silent on the question whether the party who main-
tained an inconsistent position could abandon it; and the ambiguity with
respect to this point caused some of the most pointed criticisms of the
section."' In the absence of a right to withdraw at any time, the taxpayer
could unwittingly fall into serious traps without any unconscionable action
on his part. 2 Prudently, the Treasury regulations were clangedL3 and
they now provide:
"Neither the Commissioner nor the taxpayer is required to adopt
an inconsistent position with respect to the treatment of an item
or transaction in the determination of the excess profits credit ....
Such item or transaction may . . . be treated in a manner consist-
ent with the incorrect treatment accorded in the determination of
the income tax liability if neither the Commissioner nor the taxpayer
"inconsistency" calling for the application of section 734. But suppose the taxpayer claims
that the proper basis for depreciation at the beginning of 1940 is $700 (the original cost
of $1,000 less correct depreciation of $50 per year for the six prior years) and that the
depreciation properly allowable for 1940 is $50. He is perfectly willing to have section
734 apply to his case because the increase in his current depreciation (above what the
Commissioner has allowed) and the increase in his excess profits credit will more than
make up for the additional tax with respect to the six prior years. At first blush, it
might seem that there is an "inconsistency," but on more careful consideration, it will
be seen that there is not because the taxpayer's action in 1940 is not "correct" under
the regulations relating to depreciation, whereas the Commissioner's action is correct.
(It may be noted that in an example in the regulations involving erroneous depreciation,
the amount claimed by the taxpayer was less than the amount allowable. See U. S. Treas.
Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.) Another argument that might be used by the Commissioner in this
situation is that correction of the original error is not barred. The over-depreciation in
prior years will be corrected by under-depreciation in the current and subsequent years.
This is not a completely valid argument, however, since the correction does not take the
form contemplated by section 734.
79. Section 734(b) (1) (A).
80. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2.
81. Blodgett, supra note 16, at 643, 646.
82. Ibid. See also the Bar Association Reports cited stpra note 16.
83. T. D. 5112, 1942-1 Cum. BULt 153.
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objects. Either . . . however, may insist upon the correct treat-
ment of such item or transaction . . . but such action constitutes the
maintenance of an inconsistent position and will result in an adjust-
ment under section 734, if the party insisting upon such treatment
is the party who would be adversely affected by such adjustment.
"A taxpayer which has taken an inconsistent position with respect
to an item or transaction . . . may, upon notice to the Commission-
er in writing, withdraw from such position." 84
The committee report on the 1942 Act 8 stated that the amended regula-
tions correctly interpreted the law and no specific revision of the statute
was deemed necessary. In view of this statement there can be no doubt
but that the courts will uphold the right of either party to retire from
the inconsistent position at any time.
BURDEN OF PROVING INCONSISTENCY
Since, in the usual tax case, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer,
section 734 in its original form was severely criticized, because the Com-
missioner might, by adopting an inconsistent position,, impose on the
taxpayer the load of proving the correctness of transactions which oc-
curred many years ago. In many cases the records and other papers re-
lating to the transaction might no longer exist or they might never have
been available to the taxpayer. Thus, the taxpayer might fail to overcome
the Commissioner's inconsistent position through mere inability of proof.'"
The 1942 Act mitigates, but does not completely eliminate, this diffi-
culty by adding to the section a provision 8" that in any court proceeding
the burden of proving that an inconsistent position has been taken shall
be upon the Commissioner where the net effect of the adjustment is an
increase in the prior years' income tax and upon the taxpayer where
the net effect of the adjustment would be a decrease.8" In other words,
84. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2. The Commissioner is apparently not required
to give any notice; but it is reasonable to expect that, in practice, the Commissioner's
intention to withdraw from his inconsistent position will be communicated to the tax-
payer.
85. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 212.
86. Blodgett, sutpra note 16, at 650.
87. Section 734(b) (3).
88. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 214. The report adds: "It is
not intended that this provision shall be construed to relieve the taxpayer from liability
for the penalties imposed for a false or fraudulent return or for a willful failure to supply
the information required by law or regulations made under authority of law." Ibid. And
the regulations state: "Inasmuch as the adjustment under section 734 is a factor in the
determination of the excess profits tax liability, the provisions relative to the burden of
proof in a Board or court proceeding do not relieve the taxpayer from responsibility for
a full disclosure of the facts necessary to the correct determination of the tax liability."
U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 734-2.
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the party who would benefit from the adjustment is the party who must
bear the burden of proving the inconsistency. Since the section does not
operate, at all, unless the party who takes the inconsistent position is the
party who would be adversely affected by the adjustment, the party whose
inconsistency results in the operation of the section is not the party who
must prove inconsistent treatment. Assume, for example, that the Com-
missioner in auditing the taxpayer's 1940 excess profits tax return as-
serts that a deduction theretofore allowed the taxpayer in 1935 was prop-
erly deductible in 1936. Assume further that the allowance of the deduc-
tion in 1936 would result in a greater overpayment for 1936 than the
deficiency for 1935. The adjustment, therefore, is against the Commis-
sioner and the section is applicable; but, for the very reason that the
adjustment is in favor of the taxpayer, the latter is faced with the bur-
den of proving the Commissioner's inconsistency. Reverse the situation.
Assume the taxpayer claims that a deduction previously allowed for 1936
is properly allowable in 1935, and that the deficiency for 1936 is greater
than the overpayment for 1935. Here the burden of proving the tax-
payer's inconsistent treatment will be upon the Commissioner. But the
fact that the burden of proving inconsistency is upon the Commissioner
does not relieve the taxpayer from his customary burden of establishing
the correctness of his present claim that the deduction was properly al-
lowable in 1935." In actual practice, all the Commissioner must do in
such a case is to show that the deduction was claimed and allowed in 1936.
The amendment, therefore, eases the difficulty but does not eliminate
it. Loss of the returns or records for the year of wrong treatment might
prevent the tax-payer in the first situation or the Commissioner in the re-
verse situation from proving the inconsistency, with the result that even
though there was in fact discrepancy, the inconsistent party could be in-
consistent without having to pay the price of his inconsistency.
METHOD AND AMOUNT OF ADJUSTMENT
In computing the cost " of "inconsistency," it may be taken for granted
that since the taxpayer has the privilege of withdrawing at any time
from an inconsistent position, he will always withdraw if he finds the
position unprofitable. Similarly, if the Commissioner realizes that his
inconsistency will result in an over-all saving of tax to the taxpayer, he
will hardly persevere in the inconsistent position. Therefore, the pit-
falls previously envisioned for the section "' seem to have disappeared.
89. In this connection, note the caveats quoted mspra note MS.
90. We are here speaking of the amount of the adjustment. As stated in notes 73
and 74 supra, there will presumably be an over-all gain as a result of taking the incon-
sistent position; otherwise the position will not be taken, or, if taken, it will be abandoned.
9f. Blodgett, supra note 16.
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In deciding whether to maintain or abandon the inconsistent position.
the party asserting the position will balance against the immediate sav-
ing in excess profits tax (before adjustment) not only the amount of
the adjustment but also its effect upon future years.
Method of adjustment. 2 The adjustment required by section 734 rep-
resents the net increase or decrease in prior years' income tax liabilities,
including interest. With one exception such an adjustment affects only
the excess profits tax of the first excess profits tax year in which the in-
consistent position is maintained." That tax will be increased or decreased
by the amount of the adjustment. Since the adjustment is added to the
excess profits tax liability, the taxpayer always pays the full price for its
past error. But prior to the 1942 Act, if the adjustment was a decrease,
it could only be used to the extent of the excess profits tax liability before
adjustment of the first year in which the inconsistent position was main-
tained. Thus, the Commissioner had an advantage; he always collected
the full price for the taxpayer's inconsistency, but he might not always
be required to pay the full price for his own corrected error. If his in-
consistency in 1942, for example, produced an overpayment for the prior
years of $100,000 and excess profits tax liability for 1942 before adjust-
ment was only $60,000, the remaining $40,000 was lost to the taxpayer.
By virtue of an amendment in the 1942 Act, the section now provides
that if the adjustment is a decrease and such decrease exceeds the excess
profits tax of the year in which the position is finally adopted, the excess
may be applied to reduce excess profits taxes of succeeding taxable years."'
In the example just stated, the $40,000 would be applied to reduce 1943
excess profits tax liability, and if the liability for 1943 before adjustment
should be less than $40,000, the remainder could be carried forward to
1944 and ad infinituin. 5
Although the statute makes no specific provision, both the committee
reports I6 and the regulations 97 state that if a determination of excess
profits tax liability for one taxable year requires an adjustment under
section 734 with respect to a particular item, similar treatment of the
same item for subsequent excess profits tax taxable years does not author-
ize a further adjustment under the section. Suppose that in 1942 the tax-
payer asserts that an exchange in connection with a particular corporate
reorganization in 1936 which was treated as tax-free for that year was
92. Section 734(c).
93. It is, of course, assumed that the inconsistent position is not abandoned.
94. Section 734(c) (4).
95. If excesses result from adjustments with respect to more than one excess profits
tax taxable year, such excesses are carried forward in the order of their occurrence.
See the example in U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-3.
96. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 212.
97. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-2.
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not properly tax-free because the continuity of interest test was not met."
The Commissioner acquiesces in this determination and section 734 be-
comes applicable, so that the taxpayer's 1942 excess profits tax is in-
creased by the increase in 1936 liability, plus interest thereon. The fact
that in its 1943 excess profits tax return the taxpayer takes the same posi-
tion with respect to this transaction as it did in 1942, does not authorize
any adjustment in 1943."
Amount of adjustment.'"0 To ascertain the amount which must be
added to or subtracted from excess profits tax liability, three separate steps
must be taken: the income tax of the taxpayer or its predecessor (or pre-
decessors) must be deternined for the closed years affected by the adjust-
ment; the increase or decrease in such tax that would result soley from
consistent, that is, correct treatment must be determined; and interest
must be added to the increase or decrease. The income tax previously de-
termined for the prior year will be the tax shown on the return plus or
minus any changes in that amount. Deficiencies will be added; refunds,
credits, and abatements will be subtracted; and if an adjustment under
section 3801 has been made, that, too, must be taken into account.101
In computing the increase or decrease resulting "solely" from consist-
ent treatment, the word "solely" is somewhat bothersome. The regula-
tions 1-0 and the committee reports '03 state that in computing the in-
crease or decrease, no item shall be considered except the item which was
erroneously treated and the items upon which the tax previously deter-
mined was based.10 4 If there are several adjustments with respect to one
excess profits tax taxable year, the separate adjustments are aggregated;
but in computing the amount of each adjustment, all the other adjust-
ments are ignored.'" Take the case, for example, of a corporate taxpayer
which succeeded in 1941 to the business of a partnership. In 1942 it
asserts that a $10,000 item of income, which was reported as income by
the predecessor partnership for 1937, properly belonged in 1938. Assume
that the adjustment of 1937-1938 taxes by reason of shifting the income
98. Suppose the taxpayer asserted that the reorganizati,.n had no business purpose?
If the Commissioner chose to contest this assertion, he might be in the anomalous posi-
tion of having to prove that the reorganization did have a business purpose.
99. The credit for foreign taxes allowable against excess profits tax, section 729, is
computed without giving effect to any adjustment under section 734. U. S. Treas. Reg.
109, § 30.734-3.
100. Section 734(d).
101. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4. If no return was filed, the amount of tax pre-
viously determined will consist of deficiencies less refunds, credits, or abatements and plus
or minus any adjustment under section 3801.
102. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
103. H. R. RaP. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942) 18.
104. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
105. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-3, interpreting section 734(c) (2).
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to the latter year will be in favor of the Commissioner. The taxpayer
also asserts, in 1942, that a $10,000 deduction claimed by the predeces-
sor partnership in 1937 was properly deductible in 1935. Assume the shift
of the deduction to the earlier year will again favor the Commissioner.
The effect of the shift of income from 1937 and the effect of the shift
of the deduction from that year are determined independently of each
other. Thus, if the predecessor 10" were a taxpayer subject to graduated
rates of tax, the decrease with respect to 1937 liability resulting from the
first adjustment would be less than the increase resulting from the second
adjustment since each adjustment would fall into different tax brackets.
Whether such anomalous result was intended by Congress is open to ques-
tion; but, while there may be individual cases of distortion, the rule set
forth in the regulations seems to be a sensible one. If each adjustment
were made dependent upon the others, complications would set in, and
the recomputation of tax liability would becdme exceedingly difficult.
And since each party has the right to withdraw from each separate incon-
sistent position at any time, unless the adjustments are computed inde-
pendently, it will be impossible, where more than one adjustment is in-
volved with respect to the same prior year, for one party to know exactly
where he stands and whether it is better for him to recede from the incon-
sistent position or to pursue it.
As already-pointed out, the only items to enter into the adjustment
apart from the items which have been inconsistently treated are the items
upon which the tax previously determined was based. If in the prior
determination the taxpayer overlooked a deduction or the Commissioner
omitted an item from gross income and there is no present inconsistency
with respect to these omissions, these forgotten items are ignored in the
recomputation. While these omissions may produce some distortion, the
distortion is not likely to prove serious.
While each adjustment is considered separately, the effect of the ad-
justment upon all of the items which entered into the previous determina-
tion is taken into account. 10 7 Thus, if the taxpayer's charitable contribu-
tions exceeded the allowable percentage 1o" of the income previously de-
106. Presumably where the predecessor is a partnership the adjustment must carry
through to the taxes of the individual partners although the literal language of section
734(a) (4) does not appear to compel this result.
107. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4, provides: "If the treatment of any item upon
which the tax previously determined was based, or if the application of any provisions
of the internal revenue laws with respect to such tax depends upon the amount of in-
come (e.g., charitable contributions, foreign tax credit, earned income credit), readjust-
ment of such items in conformity with the change in the amount of the income which
results from the correct treatment of the item or transaction in respect of which the in-
consistent position was adopted is necessary as part of the recomputation."
108. Five per cent for corporations; fifteen per cent for individuals. See sections 23(q)
and (o).
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termined and if the adjustment involves an increase in that income, the
deduction allowable for such contributions is correspondingly increased.
Similarly, a foreign tax credit or the earned income credit might be in-
creased or decreased. Moreover, if the taxpayer was taxed as a personal
holding company in the prior year, or if the adjustment is of such a
nature that correction of the prior erroneous treatment has the effect of
converting the taxpayer into a personal holding company for that prior
year, 09 the computation will involve personal. holding company surtax;
and, if the tax-payer or its predecessor for the prior year was subjected to
the penalty surtax imposed against corporations improperly accumulating
surplus,110 the recomputation would also require an adjustment of that
surtax." Still further, it would seem that if an adjustment for one prior
year affects another prior year, as, for example, an adjustment which pro-
duces or affects a loss carry-over, the tax for the other prior year must also
be recomputed."1
Does the adjustment require a recomputation of the penalties for delin-
quency, negligence, or fraud if the tax-payer had been held subject to such
penalties in the prior year? The statute, the committee reports, and the
regulations are silent on this question; but it seems reasonable to conclude
that Congress did not mean such penalties to be disturbed. Section 734(d)
provides that "To the increase or decrease . . . [in such tax previously
determined for such years] there shall be added interest thereon computed
as if the increase or decrease constituted a deficiency or an overpayment
... " (italics supplied). A deficiency which is due in any part to neg-
ligence or fraud will automatically carry with it the penalties prescribed
in section 293; while the penalty for delinquency would attach to the en-
tire tax under section 291. Similarly, an overpayment where these pen-
alties had been imposed would be increased by the penalties erroneously
assessed. It might be argued, therefore, that adjustment under section
109. If it were a personal holding company for the year in which the inconsistent
position was taken, the section would have no application since such companies are not
subject to excess profits tax. If the correction has the effect of converting the taxpayer
into a foreign personal holding company for the prior year, recomputation of the share-
holder's taxes for that year would only be required if the persons who controlled the
taxpayer in such prior year controlled the taxpayer on or after April 1, 1941, that is,
if they were "predecessors.' See section 734(4) (a).
110. Now INT. REv. CoDm (1939) § 102.
111. It has been suggested that possibly the adjustment could result in the applica-
tion of section 102 where that section had not previously been applied. See Blodgett,
supra note 16, at 644, n. 4. However, section 102 can only be applied where a particular
purpose is present. This is, of course, a subjective test, at least in part; and hence, liability
under section 102, such liability not having previously been determined, is not susceptible
of automatic adjustment.
112. H. R. REP. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942) 17. In this respect, section
734 apparently differs from section 3801. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, jupra note
12, at 743.
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734 requires recomputation of penalties. On the other hand, it may more
plausibly be argued that in view of the specific provision for the addition
of "interest" to the increase or decrease, the failure to mention other addi-
tions to the tax means that penalties are not to be increased or decreased.
Deficiencies and overpayments automatically carry interest as well as
penalties, and it would, therefore, seem likely that if Congress meant the
adjustment to include recomputation of penalties, it would either have
omitted specific mention of interest or specifically mentioned other addi-
tions. This conclusion is luttressed by the fact that in section 3801 Con-
gress does specifically mention additions to the tax other than interest:
"The amount so ascertained (together with any amounts wrongfully col-
lected, as additions to the tax or interest, as a result of such error) shall
be the amount of the adjustment under this section." 113 The leading com-
mentators on section 3801 appear to conclude that an adjustment under
that section carries with it adjustment of penalties.1 4 But in view of the
marked difference in language between the two sections, such a conclusion
can hardly apply under section 734.11r
Interest has been included in the adjustment in an effort to balance
the scales of justice delicately. As originally enacted, the section simply
required the addition to the increase or decrease in the prior year's tax
liability of interest "as if the increase or decrease constituted a deficiency
or an overpayment, as the case may be, for such prior taxable year." But
the statute was silent as to the date to which such interest should be com-
puted. The Treasury regulations interpreted the statute to mean that in-
terest was to be "computed to the 15th day of the third month following
the close of the excess profits tax taxable year with respect to which the
determination . . . is made." "' Doubt as to the accuracy of this inter-
pretation 117 was removed by the 1942 Act which sanctions it by inserting
its very language into the statute itself.' As in the case of the computa-
tion of the increase or decrease in tax liability, the interest is computed
with respect to each increase or decrease separately.'
While there is no longer uncertainty as to the date to which interest
is computed, some doubt remains as to the date from which interest is
computed. On this point the statute, the committee reports and the regu-
lations (except by implication) are silent. Interest is computed "as if the
113. Section 3801(d).
114. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, supra note 12, at 747.
115. Still further, in case there is a fraud penalty, is not correction permitted in the
ordinary manner so that the section does not apply? See section 276(a). The inclusion
of penalties in the adjustment might produce hardship if the taxpayer did not contest the
penalty merely because it was too trivial to warrant controversy.
116. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
117. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 213.
118. Section 734(d).
119. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
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increase or decrease constituted a deficiency or an overpayment." '- A
deficiency carries interest from the date prescribed for the payment of the
first instalment of tax. In the case of an increase, it is clear, therefore,
that the interest would be computed from the fifteenth day of the third
month following the close of the prior year with respect to which the re-
computation is made.121 In the case of an overpayment, however, interest
is calculated from the date of the overpayment. 2  Accordingly, the
Treasury might have asserted that interest added to decreases is to be
computed only from the actual date of overpayment. But in an example
given in the regulations,'2 the interest on both decreases and increases is
computed from the fifteenth day of the third month following the close
of the taxable year. This would seem to accord with the intent of the
statute.124
One minor criticism of the original section with respect to interest is
still valid. Since the interest on the prior year's tax is included in the
determination of the excess profits tax deficiency or overpayment there
is a compounding of the interest on the prior year's liability12 This ob-
jection, however, is de minimus.
Treatment, as an hicome or deduction item, of interest included in the
adjustment. As originally enacted the section was somewhat ambigu-
ous on the question whether interest on the prior year's tax included in
the adjustment retained its character for tax purposes."e This difficult,
was resolved by an amendment adding a new subsection 12- which clearly
indicates that the interest does retain its character as such and constitutes
either a deduction, in case of an increase, or income, in case of a decrease.
Moreover, the same subsection specifically designates the year in which
the interest is entered as an income item or a deduction. The year pre-
scribed is the one in which falls the date prescribed for the payment of
the excess profits tax. The year is the same regardless of the method of
accounting (cash, accrual, etc.) employed by the taxpayer for its excess




123. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-4.
124. This is borne out by the fact that if interest on decreases were required to be
computed from the actual date of overpayment, and the overpayment itself included inter-
est, interest on interest would have to be computed to really put the parties in statts quo.
The section does not appear to contemplate the calculation of interest on interest.
125. Blodgett, supra note 16, at 650.
126. Ibid. See also Sax. R-P. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). The original
regulations, even after T. D. 5112, 1942-1 Cum. Buu. 153, did not cover the point.
127. Section 734(e).
128. "The date prescribed for payment of the [excess profits] tax is, in the case of a
domestic corporation, the 15th day of the third month following the close of the taxable
year and, in the case of a foreign corporation not having an office or place of business
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the same excess profits tax taxable year the interest factor in each increase
and decrease is separated out and the net of all such interest factors is
either income or a deduction.
Where section 734(c) (4)129 is involved, that is, where there is a carry-
over of decrease because the decrease with respect to the prior year ex-
ceeds the excess profits tax liability of the year in which the inconsistent
position is maintained, the regulations provide that "no portion of the
amount subtracted in any taxable year shall be deemed to represent in-
terest until the portion of the net decrease which represents tax has been
exhausted." 130
CONCLUSION
Now that we have section 734, what should we do about it? The Amer-
ican Bar Association's Excess Profits Tax Committee and the Taxation
Committee of the New York State Bar Association, at one time, asked
for its repeal. But most, if not all, of the grounds upon which their ob-
jections were based 131 have been removed by subsequent amendments.
Nor does the objection that the section unnecessarily revives old ques-
tions seem meritorious. While the advantages of a statute of repose are
too well established to require discussion, one can hardly cavil at the
soundness of the proposition that no one shall be permitted to take ad-
vantage of his own wrong. Both objectives are reconcilable. A Statute
of Limitations is supposed to be used only as a shield, not as a weapon,
and once a defendant himself revives a claim and uses it as a springboard
of attack, the reasons for a statute of repose fall away.
Nor is the cure afforded by the section worse than the disease it seeks
to remedy. It does not compel correction of honest mistakes. Such mis-
in the United States, the 15th day of the sixth month following the close of the taxable
year, except that, in the case of a taxable year ending before December 31, 1940, the
date prescribed for payment'of the tax of either a domestic or a foreign corporation is
March 15, 1941." U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-5, 3 C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Tax Serv.
48224-A.
129. See page 152 supra.
130. U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.734-5,3 C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Tax Serv. f 48224-A. The
regulation contains the following example: "For the calendar year 1942, Corporation X
had an excess profits tax liability of $9,000 (computed without regard to section 734)
and an authorized adjustment under section 734 resulting in a net decrease of $12,000 of
which $8,000 represents tax and $4,000 represents interest. In giving effect to the adjust-
ment, $9,000 will be subtracted from the tax for 1942 and the balance will be carried over
to succeeding taxable years. Since $8,000 of the net decrease represents tax, only $1,000
of the amount subtracted in 1942 represents interest and hence $1,000 will be included as
interest in the taxpayer's gross income for 1943. The entire amount of the $3,000 to be
carried over and subtracted from the tax for a succeeding taxable year represents inter-
est since the portion of the net decrease which represents tax is exhausted in 1942."
131. Most of these are listed in the Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee
on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 174.
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takes are bound to occur, and it is better to let them remain as honest
mistakes than to try to correct them years afterwards when memories are
dim and witnesses and papers no longer exist. But an honest mistake
ceases to remain honest when the errant party seeks correction without
giving up the advantage he originally derived. This is not to say that more
tax should be paid by reason of the error than if it had not been made. 3 2
Section 734 (and likewise section 3801) makes the errant party pay no
more than if he had not made the error in the first instance. Except to the
extent that the interest added under the section may exceed the rate of
return on the use of the money in the meantime, the parties are no worse
off.
Admittedly, section 734 is a complicated and difficult section. Its pos-
sibilities are limited only by the imagination. In this discussion, a number
of possible applications are presented, but they constitute only a small
fraction of the number which might arise. There may and probably will
be hard cases, but hard cases in tax law are inevitable. Absolute certainty
and precise equality are mirages. Section 734 is no more nor less perfect
than the whole tax law. It deserves a fair trial.
APPENDIX: SECTION 734
Adjustment in case of position inconsistent with prior incomne tax liability
(a) Definitions. For the purposes of this section-
(1) Taxpayer. The term "taxpayer" means any person subject to a tax
under the applicable revenue Act.
(2) Income tax. The term "income tax" means an income tax imposed
by Chapter 1 or Chapter 2A of this title; Title I and Title Lk of the Revenue
Acts of 1938, 1936, and 1934; Title I of the Revenue Acts of 1932 and 1928;
Title II of the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1924; Title II of the Revenue Acts
of 1921 and 1918; Title I of the Revenue Act of 1917; Title I of the Revenue
Act of 1916; or section II of the Act of October 3, 1913; a war profits or excess
profits tax imposed by Title III of the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1918; or Title
II of the Revenue Act of 1917; or an income, war profits, or excess profits tax
imposed by any of the foregoing provisions, as amended or supplemented.
(3) Prior taxable year. A taxable year beginning after December 31,
1939, shall not be considered a prior taxable year.
(4) The term "predecessor of the taxpayer" means-
(A) A person which is a component corporation of the taxpayer
within the meaning of section 740; and
(B) A person which on April 1, 1941, or at any time there-
after, controlled the taxpayer. The term "controlled" as herein used
shall have the same meaning as "control" under section 112(h), and
(C) Any person in an unbroken series ending with the taxpayer
if subparagraph (A) or (B) would apply to the relationship between
the parties.
132. The doctrine of estoppel might put him in such a position, and this is probably
one of the reasons the courts are loath to apply the estoppel theory.
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(b) Circuinsta wes of adjustment.
(1) If-
(A) in determining at any time the tax of a taxpayer under this sub-
chapter an item affecting the determination of the excess profits credit is treated
in a manner inconsistent with the treatment accorded such item in the deter-
mination of the income-tax liability of such taxpayer or a predecessor for a
prior taxable year or years, and
(B) the treatment of such item in the prior taxable year or years con-
sistently with the determination under this subchapter would effect an increase
or decrease in the amount of the income taxes previously determined for such
taxable year or years, and
(C) on the date of such determination of the tax under this subchapter
correction of the effect of the inconsistent treatment in any one or more of the
prior taxable years is prevented (except for the provisions of section 3801) by
the operation of any law or rule of law (other than section 3761, relating to
compromises),
then the correction shall be made by an adjustment under this section. If in a sub-
sequent determination of the tax under this subchapter for such taxable year such
inconsistent treatment is not adopted, the correction shall not be made in connection
with such subsequent determination.
(2) Such adjustment shall be made only if there is adopted in the determina-
tion a position maintained by the Commissioner (in case the net effect of the adjust-
ment would be a decrease in the income taxes previously determined for such year
or years) or by the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made (in case
the net effect of the adjustment would be an increase in the income taxes previously
determined for such year or years) which position is inconsistent with the treat-
ment accorded such item in the prior taxable year or years which was not correct
under the law applicable to such year.
(3) Burden of proof. In any proceeding before the Board or any court the bur-
den of proof in establishing that an inconsistent position has been taken (A) shall
be upon the Commissioner, in case the net effect of the adjustment would be an
increase in the income taxes previously determined for the prior taxable year or
years, or (B) shall be upon the taxpayer, in case the net effect of the adjustment
would be a decrease in the income taxes previously determined for the prior tax-
able year or years.
(c) Method and effect of adjustment.
(1) The adjustment authorized by subsection (b), in the amount ascertained
as provided in subsection (d), if a net increase shall be added to, and if a net de-
crease shall be subtracted from, .the tax otherwise computed under this subchapter for
the taxable year with respect to which such inconsistent position is adopted.
(2) If more than one adjustment under this section is made because more
than one inconsistent position is adopted with respect to one taxable year under this
subchapter, the separate adjustments, each an amount ascertained as provided in sub-
section (d), shall be aggregated, and the aggregate net increase or decrease shall be
added to or subtracted from the tax otherwise computed under this subchapter for
the taxable year with respect to which such inconsistent positions are adopted.
(3) If all the adjustments under this section, made on account of the adoption
of an inconsistent position or positiofis with respect to one taxable year under this
subchapter, result in an aggregate net increase, the tax imposed by this subchapter
shall in no case be less than the amount of such aggregate net increase.
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(4) If all the adjustments under this section. made nn account of the adoption
of an inconsistent position or positions with respect to a taxable year under this sub-
chapter (hereinafter in this paragraph called the current taxable year), result in an
aggregate net decrease, and the amount of such decrease exceeds the tax imposed by
this subchapter (without regard to the provisions of this section) for the current tax-
able year, such excess shall be subtracted from the tax imposed by this subchapter
for each succeeding taxable year, but the amount of the excess to be so subtracted
shall be reduced by the reduction in tax for intervening taxable years which has re-
sulted from the subtraction of such excess from the tax imposed for each such year.
(d) Asccrtainicnt of amount of adjusncnt. In computing the amount of an ad-
justment under this section there shall first be ascertained the amount of the income
taxes previously determined for each of the prior taxable years for which correction
is prevented. The amount of each such tax previously determined for each such tax-
able year shall be (1) the tax shown by the taxpayer, or by the predecessor, upon
the return for such prior taxable year. increased by the amounts previously assessed
(or collected without assessment) as deficiencies, and decreased by the amounts pre-
viously abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax; or
(2) if no amount was shown as the tax by such taxpayer or such predecessor upon
the return, or if no return was made by such taxpayer or such predecessor, then the
amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as deficiencies, but
such amounts previously assessed, or collected without assessment, shall be decreased
by the amounts previously abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect
of such tax. There shall then be ascertained the increase or decrease in each such
tax previously determined for each such year which results solely from the treat-
ment of the item consistently with the treatment accorded such item in the determina-
tion of the tax liability under this subchapter. To the increase or decrease so ascer-
tained for each such tax for each such year there shall be added interest thereon com-
puted as if the increase or decrease constituted a deficiency or an overpayment, as the
case may be, for such prior taxable year. Such interest shall be computed to the fif-
teenth day of the third month following the close of the excess profits tax taxable
year with respect to which the determination is made. There shall be ascertained the
difference between the aggregate of such increases, plus the interest attributable to
each, and the aggregate of such decreases, plus the interest attributable to each, and
the net increase or decrease so ascertained shall be the amount of the adjustment under
this section with respect to the inconsistent treatment of such item.
(e) Intcrest in casc of siet increase or decrease.
(1) If an adjustment under this section results in a net decrease, or more
than one adjustment results in an aggregate net decrease, the portion of such net
decrease or aggregate net decrease, as the case may be, subtracted from the tax
which represents interest shall be included in gross income of the taxable year in
which falls the date prescribed for the payment of the tax under this subchapter.
(2) If an adjustment under this section results in a net increase, or more than
one adjustment results in an aggregate net increase, the portion of such net increase
or aggregate net increase, as the case may be, which represents interest shall be
allowed as a deduction in computing net income for the taxable year in which falls
the date prescribed for the payment of the tax under this subchapter. Added Mar. 7,
1941, c. 10, § 11, 55 Stat. 27; amended Oct. 21, 1942, 4:30 p. m., F_. V. T., c. 619,
Title II, § 227(a), 56 Stat. 921-23.
